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INTRODUCTION
The study presents a complex of the international 
problems generated by the Civil War in Spain 1936-1939. 
They began to be one of the important factors which have 
determined European situation on the eve of the second 
World War. The conflict in Spain at once has gone under 
sharply confrontational script. Having broken political 
balance on the European continent, it destabilized 
conditions in the mediterranean too.
Among geopolitical aspects of the Civil War in Spain 
mediterranean aspect is allocated. The understanding of 
the international aspects of the Civil War in Spain, 
1936-1939 will not be complete without consideration of a 
role, a place and value in their complex of mediterranean 
aspect. The mediterranean crisis caused by the Italian 
aggression in Abyssinia has got new depth with the 
beginning of Civil War in Spain. It was, certainly, a part of 
all-European pre-war crisis. It got different forms and 
showed various precedents of the decision of the 
intermediate questions.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
In the research various types of the analysis are 
implied: the principle scientific objectivity, historicism,
involving the consideration of the problem in all its 
diversity and requiring systemic treatment with historical 
sources and literature.
Such research methods as a method of historical 
descriptions, problem-chronological and specific analysis 
are also used in study. The tasks in research led to the 
frequent reference to the interdisciplinary sciences 
(Geopolitics, world politics, etc.). Historical and 
systematic method made it possible to consider a given 
problem in a complex of the international aspects of the 
war in Spain. Historical-comparative method allowed to 
identify common trends and specific policies of the 
European countries in the mediterranean sea in 1936-1939.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Main part: The mediterranean met the beginning of the 
Spanish tragedy in a condition of complex, both 
international and mutual relations, turning in the potential 
center of war. The British interests in the mediterranean 
sea were stacked in imperial, geopolitical interests, being 
crossed with Italian interests. But in the period under 
review “the British fleet could adequately confront only 
one enemy at the same place at the same time” (Bell, 
1969).
Fascist Italy identified these interests with national. 
Mussolini even 3 years before coming to power has
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declared: “The first thing to do is to expel foreigners, 
since the British from the mediterranean” (Morewood, 
1989).
For France, Germany and the Soviet Union the 
mediterranean problems under these circumstances had 
the subordinated character.
In opinion of German diplomats and politicians, the 
period after occupation of the Rhine zone was marked not 
only by growth of German influence in Europe but also 
strengthening of the Italian military power, opportunity 
which have almost deprived France of performance of its 
allied obligations in the East of Europe by means of land 
forces. In such sense the Mediterranean Sea was 
represented by the super important arena for the potential 
military expansion and a line of distribution of troops and 
ammunition from small entente or Russia.
The Spanish conflict by virtue of geopolitical 
factors seriously touched a policy of the countries 
considering Mediterranean Sea as a sphere of the 
economic, military-political or colonial interests.
Fasc ist leaders as it is known, connected 
strengthening of the national safety directly with 
expansion goals. For mussolini this task was projected in 
the greater degree to mediterranean sea and the central 
Europe, though till November 28, 1936 the Italian 
government formally did not proclaim the political and 
economic help to the Spanish nationalists (Coverdale, 
1975). For Hitler Civil War in Spain was a convenient 
opportunity for realization of the spatial expansion’s 
concept, distracting Italy from the central European 
problems and focusing on Iberian Peninsula and on the 
Western Mediterranean.
Fascist Italy, putting in a claim for mediterranean’s 
“mistress” could not feel itself like comfortably if the 
entrance and exit in this “house” belonged to another. 
“We can ascertain with pride that today above 
mediterranean sea there is no point, capable to escape our 
control”, this conclusion was made by Italian deputy 
minister of aircraft general Valle in April 1936.
France and Great Britain have found the best variant 
a “neutral” position non-intervention in Spain. This idea 
at the initial stage of war was maintained also by the 
Soviet leaders.
Italy and Germany determined their positions and the 
attitude to events developed in Spain already at the end 
of July, having interfered in them by support of rebels. 
Signing by them in August 1936 the agreement on 
non-intervention did not bring essential corrective 
amendments to these installations.
There was an intensive work in August 1936 in the 
British government on development of tactics both in 
actually Spanish and in mediterranean questions
(Buchanan, 2003). In other cases, the mediterranean 
aspect subordinated itself to actually Spanish. The first 
British vision of the Spanish situation was done as a 
whole through a prism of imperial interests: it was 
emphasized by heads and public figures of various 
political directions (Maiskii et al., 1937). The British 
politics realized that Italy perceived war in Spain not only 
as struggle of communist and fascist ideologies but also 
mainly as an opportunity “to strengthen the influence and 
to weaken the British sea’s power in the Western 
mediterranean” .
Minister for Foreign Affairs A. Eden believed that the 
Italian strengthening in the Western Mediterranean 
“would give deep roots” and the Italo-British antagonism 
in that case could get sharper forms, than even in 1935. 
Having analyzed as the victory of this or that 
contradictory sides over Spain would affect Italy, Eden 
considered that “we should keep Spain from Italy”.
To maintain prestige of “Great sea power” it was 
necessary to keep greatest possible the positions in 
mediterranean sea. As a whole, Britain has found more 
expedient during the considered period to solve problems 
in the Mediterranean Sea by a method of reconciliation, 
instead of resistance.
In day of the beginning of rebellion in the Spanish 
Morocco, German ambassador in Rome Hassel, yet not 
having the information about it, emphasized that the 
Italian relations with the western countries were defined 
entirely by problems of the Mediterranean Sea and 
dardanelles.
The beginning of the Italo German help to Franco and 
the designated prospect of consolidation of political and 
strategic positions of the fascist states on Iberian 
Peninsula created a certain danger to Great Britain and 
France. Capture of Balearic Islands by Italy had cut means 
of communication of France from Morocco for Great 
Britain the problem of the mediterranean passages 
seriously became aggravated.
The Soviet diplomacy constantly exaggerated and 
emphasized an idea of danger to Britain fascist victories 
over Spain. As the analysis of archival documents shows, 
the Soviet ambassador I.M. Maiskii came back to this idea 
hardly probable not during eveiy meeting with English 
politicians, diplomats and public figures (Beseda et al.,
1936).
Mussolini received not only a victory over Ethiopia, 
but also a field for political maneuver in Europe: it was 
possible to try to agree with France and Britain, 
speculating on the Spanish and mediterranean problems. 
Thus, not losing hope to play “the German card”. As the 
Soviet Ambassador in Rome Stein wrote, “Italy tried to 
sell as expensive as possible the possible anti-German 
position”.
856
The Soviet diplomacy at the end of May 1936 had 
information that Italy had given England far-reaching 
guarantees in questions not only Abyssinia, safety of 
Egypt but also distribution of English and the Italian 
influence in the mediterranean sea. Between the countries 
there was no agreement on the specified problems but 
there was “a gentlemen’s agreement” on the basic lines. 
“The gentlemen’s agreement” for the considered moment 
meant that England silently took into account those 
guarantees which Italian ambassador in London Grandi 
formulated on behalf of the Italian government. It was 
planned to transform this arrangement to the agreement, 
“when passions would calm”. The Spanish drama 
removed the conclusion of “the gentlemen's agreement” 
till January 1937 and gave a new painting to it.
During Reich minister’s Hans Frank visit to Italy (the 
end of September 1936) it was emphasized, in particular 
that Germany would not interfere with the Italian 
aspirations to domination in mediterranean. The hope was 
expressed that Italy in turn, did not begin to resist German 
policy in Austria. After discussion of British policy Ciano 
wrote down in his diary: “our relations with London are 
bad veiy much also cannot improve “the owner of the 
mediterranean sea is and always there will be Italy” 
(Ciano, 1948).
As it is known Ciano on being on a visit to Berlin in 
20th of October, has signed the so called report of Berlin 
Rome “Axis”. The Soviet diplomacy regarded this report, 
as “an easy kick to the address of England” and results of 
Ciano’s visit as “wreck of hopes for an opportunity of 
direct arrangement (Italy) with England on questions of 
the Mediterranean pool”.
The policy of non-intervention in Spain testified to 
impossibility of the conclusion of the collective agreement 
across the mediterranean, besides after conference in 
Montreux the British politicians did not locate to 
collective actions. They defined the conclusion to attempt 
of normalization of the Anglo-Italian relations.
In well-known Mussolini’s speech in Milan (on 
November 1, 1936) reconciliatoiy accentuated and the 
offer of England to enter into the gentlemen’s agreement 
on the basic problems of the mediterranean was 
distributed. Similar invitations to negotiations were 
repeated by Italians at different political and diplomatic 
levels.
On Januaiy 2, 1937 the Anglo-Italian declaration was 
signed. According to this rather streamline document, the 
mediterranean was admitted a zone of vital interests of 
British Empire and Italy, both sides undertook to support 
the status quo in it as well as both mutual rights and 
interests in this region. Spain had not been mentioned in 
the declaration. In strictly legal sense, the agreement had
no any attitude to it but “politically as I.M. Maiskii wrote 
to Vice-Minister N.N. Krestinskii, just the Spanish affairs 
are litmus piece of paper for definition of value of the 
Anglo-Italian contract” .
“The London politics as always, believed wrongly 
that, slightly patted Mussolini shoulder, it is possible to 
convince him not too zealously to interfere with internal 
affairs of Iberian peninsula, threatening thus preservation 
of the European world and safety of the British 
communications with the East” were marked by 
Maiskii and Litvinovy (1937).
The Soviet side fairly believed, that it was more 
difficultly for Italy to find common language with France, 
than with England and process of improvement of 
relations between these countries would develop slow 
rates and substantially to depend on situation in Spain. 
Aspiring to avoid the international arrangements without 
its participation, the Soviet diplomacy, applied a maximum 
of efforts on their non-admission.
“The gentlemen’s agreement” on an outcome of the 
second month of “action” has opened rather curious 
situation: according to Russian ambassador in Rome 
B. Shtein’s sarcastic expression in it, “there were no 
neither agreements, nor gentlemen”.
Thus, the Anglo-Italian agreement which was 
generated by the Spanish conflict has failed even in part 
to decide its problems and only established for some time 
veiy unsteady modus vivendi in the Western 
Mediterranean.
The spring of 1937 was marked by the further 
complication of a situation in Mediterranean Sea and 
around of Spain.
In the middle of April 1937 Eden shared the opinion 
with his military colleagues that Italy represented more 
danger to the world, than Germany and that “now war 
could arise more likely in the mediterranean, than 
somewhere else in Europe” (Pratt, 1975).
Soviet Diplomacy (Maiskii) considered (April 1937), 
that the tensions in the Anglo-Italian relations could 
decrease under influence of those or other circumstances, 
emphasizing that “the key to a course of events in Spain 
in many respects was in Mussolini’s hands” .
Non-intervention policy’s crisis (June 1937) which 
began as the mediterranean crisis for a while has 
complicated attempts of the Anglo-Italian 
rapprochement.
Then in the European diplomatic circles hearings 
have amplified that official London puts forward an idea 
of triple Italian-Anglo-French the mediterranean pact with 
acknowledgement of preservation of territorial integrity of 
Spain. “By itself, the English contribution will be 
expressed also in recognition of annexation of Abyssinia” 
Litvinov considered.
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In opinion of the Soviet diplomacy, the Spanish 
aspect was included in a question on domination on 
mediterranean sea “as a part just the general problem 
named more”.
In German and Soviet tactics in this question some 
similarity was traced: the German diplomacy tried (and 
finally it was possible) to convince Italy of own 
disinterest in the given region, “having managed to get” 
at Italy the Central Europe in exchange for the Western 
mediterranean and Spain. The Soviet diplomacy, 
whenever possible did its best to bring in disagreements 
between the present and future international opponents, 
exaggerated in their eyes a geostrategic role and the 
importance of the mediterranean (Payne, 2004).
CONCLUSION
Thus, the mediterranean aspect of the Spanish 
problem began as one of litmus pieces of paper who 
precisely found out original character of bilateral as well 
as the international relations. At separate stages the 
situation around of Spain complicated the mediterranean 
crisis in others developed in parallel or even got the 
subordinated character.
It is possible to allocate the following phases of the 
mediterranean crisis in a context of the international 
aspects of the Civil war in Spain:
• July 1936 up to May 1937. It was the beginning of the 
Civil war in Spain, definition of the attitude to it of 
leading European powers, a prevalence of the 
Spanish problems in the mediterranean crisis, its slow 
character (“a so-called prestorm condition”)
• Summer 1937 crisis of a policy of “non-intervention”; 
mediterranean sea started to play more and more 
actively a role of a change card (especially on a line 
England Italy)
• The end of August up to September 1937. It was a 
time of an aggravation of the mediterranean problems 
in connection with a piracy of so called “unknown 
submarines”; the Italy-Soviet diplomatic scandal; 
Nyon conference
• The end of 1937 up to March 1938. In this period an 
Anglo-Italian “vector” in the mediterranean crisis 
prevalenced, military presence of these countries in 
region strengthen, alongside ways of peace 
settlement of controversial problems were being 
searched. The Anglo-Italian agreement was signed
• Spring 1938 up to September 1939. The amplitude of 
the mediterranean crisis was reduced; it was 
gradually subordinated to all-European crisis. It was 
also a time of complications or improvements in this
context of mutual relations. The Spanish war came to 
its end. The policy of appeasement in Spain as well 
as in the mediterranean failed
T о summarize, the Spanish war became catalyst of the 
further deepening of the international contradictions in 
this region, having strengthened tendencies of “the 
Mediterranean appeasement” as well as forming block 
policy. As shows the analysis, actually mediterranean 
problem for the Great Britain and Italy during some 
moments prevailed above actually Spanish, dooming last 
on longer and heavy agony.
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